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Women manual workers’ introduction into a Norwegian shipyard 1965-1989.     
Abstract 
We investigate women’s introduction to skilled production jobs in Norway’s largest 
shipyard, 1965-80, estimating the experiment’s success.  We analyze the difficulties 
experienced in adapting working conditions and culture to the women entrants, using a  
theoretical industrial relations/occupational health and safety lens. Working conditions 
resulted in considerable occupational illness among the women.  Job tenure was therefore 
short, helping sustain an intra-occupational gender pay gap.    A management-union 
alliance established and maintained women’s ‘reserve’ and ‘helper’ statuses.  Women’s 
collective voice was highly circumscribed. Our evidence supports previous arguments that 
social and industrial relations configurations were among Norwegian yards’ problems in 
responding to powerful global competitive pressures. However, we argue that 
management-union cooperation, rather than conflict, underlay this experiment’s limited 
success. 
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We analyse women’s introduction into a Norwegian shipyard, Solheimsviken in Bergen, in 
the fifteen years following 1965 to assess its success.  This was the first peacetime 
experiment (as many contemporaries dubbed it) in introducing women to production roles in 
Norwegian shipbuilding. Experts considered Solheimsviken’s experiment typical of firms in 
the Norwegian National Shipbuilders’ Federation, most of which recruited women in these 
years (‘Lecture - women in heavy industry’ 1975. Bergen Public Archive (BPA) Box 74). 
   From the 1960s, a new generation of young, unmarried women which had not undergone 
the debilitating experience of wartime forced industrial labour entered Norwegian workplaces 
(Hatlehol, 2018).  They wished to combine work and family roles, seeking higher 
remuneration than that offered in retail, and gender pay equality (Jensen, 1981).  Norwegian 
women’s demands for industrial involvement had a long political pedigree (Moksnes, 1984, 
p. 152) and popular gender egalitarian ideas (‘feminism without feminists’) existed among 
these women (Skjeie & Siim, 2000; Holter, 1970; Jensen, 1981).  Tension therefore existed 
between their expectations and the situation in society and heavy industry.  The women 
studied here entered jobs graded as skilled; their entry therefore challenged long-established 
exclusionary practices by unions dominated by skilled men and managements that came from 
similar backgrounds.  Government policy post-1945 strongly encouraged married women 
through a range of incentives to work in the home (Holter, 1970) and Norway therefore had 
low rates of women’s employment.  By 1965, Norwegian women had registered little 
improvement on previously low levels of workplace gender equality (Jensen, 1981; Danielsen 
et al, 2013).  Average hourly pay for women blue collar workers in manufacturing was by 
1960 just 67 percent of that of men (Statistics Norway, 2018).  The pioneering feminist 
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sociologist Harriet Holter (1970) argued that this was partly because women employees were 
stereotyped as unreliable by male managers.   
     We contribute to debates on the precise nature of the difficulties faced by Norwegian (and, 
by extension, European) shipbuilding in meeting the challenges posed by increasingly fierce 
foreign competition.  Our major contribution is however to show that a previously under-
acknowledged body of theory which we identify and denominate Industrial Relations 
Occupational Health and Safety (IROHS) theory offers a useful lens when analysing 
women’s involvement in heavy industrial environments.  The theory originated in the late 
1960s, continues to develop and we contribute to it.  Because of its focus on workers’ 
experience of work, IROHS helps us contribute to an area in which neither business nor-
somewhat ironically- labour history have been strong.  We do not argue that IROHS provides 
a complete explanation of the difficulties faced by the women recruits in our case.  Still less 
does it offer a comprehensive explanation of European shipbuilding’s decline.  Rather, we 
simply suggest that it offers a novel and fruitful set of insights helping to answer our research 
issue which may have previously unrecognised uses in other cognate contexts.    
The remainder of the article is structured as follows.  Initially, we outline previous 
historiographic perspectives and explain IROHS theory. Our method and sources are then 
described. Next, we provide background on Solheimsviken and how the recruitment initiative 
developed.  In the subsequent section we use archival and newspaper sources with recent 
interviews to develop our multi-facetted argument. In outline, this is that women’s 
opportunities were strictly limited by the ways that management conceived of their 
contribution.     Management attitudes and policies on women’s employment and  OHS 
broadly defined were important to women’s experience both per se and also because they 
were linked to recruits’ turnover.  These links constitute a contribution to the ways in which 
labour processes and their results have been conceived of in historical writing on post-war 
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shipbuilding, illustrates the difficulties encountered in one significant initiative and  provides 
insight into one of the profound company-and workplace-level issues involved in Norwegian 
yards’ response to global competition. 
 
Historiography  
It is widely recognised that the state-coordinated economies of East Asia, beginning with 
Japan and subsequently followed by South Korea and China (currently the world’s largest 
shipbuilding nation) challenged European shipbuilding’s global role from the 1950s onwards.  
Competition gradually intensified until European yards began to close from the 1980s as 
world demand reduced; revived demand in the 1990s primarily benefitted Asian producers 
(OECD, 2017).  Asian shipbuilders innovated extensively, employed women in considerable 
numbers and set new international production standards (for Japan, see Abe & Fitzgerald, 
1995).  
     Despite some success for two yards in moving into the niche of chemical container 
shipping (Murphy & Tenold, 2008), most of Norway’s shipbuilding industry post-1945 was 
characterised by the low innovation intensity typical of that economy (Grønning et al 2008).   
Debates have occurred on why Norwegian shipbuilders had initially been slow to diversify 
into new product markets such as oil tankers, particularly as their British competitors were 
latecomers to that important market.  Had they responded more rapidly to other possibilities, 
they might have mitigated the speed of their national industry’s decline, as Danish 
shipbuilders proved able to do (Poulsen & Sornn-Friese, 2011).  Scholars have argued that 
explanations for Norwegian shipbuilding’s limited capacity to adapt to the changing 
environment may lie in numerous directions. These include the interactions between 
international and national regulatory systems (Brautaset & Tenold, 2008), inadequate 
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investment, under-developed technology and business strategies rooted in their technological 
and organisational bases (for a summary of debates around the latter factors, see Andersen, 
1997, p. 489).  The factors are clearly inter-related, but we show in detail how the final aspect 
of Andersen’ s persuasive explanation—strategies based on existing technological and social 
bases-- operated in one important workplace.  Some treatments emphasise management-
worker conflict and worker-worker division.  Thus, Barnett (1996), referring primarily to 
British shipbuilding, presents a developed, politically conservative, polemical account which 
tends to enlarge certain factors which also feature in analyses provided by other authors 
referring to Norwegian and European shipbuilding (for just two examples, see Andersen, 
1997; OECD 2017).  Barnett emphasises manager-worker conflict and high strike rates and 
draws attention to demarcations between groups of skilled workers reflected in multiple-
union workplaces.  Finally, he stresses an extreme lack of flexibility between groups of 
tradesmen, allegedly limiting technological and organisational innovation.  We examine the 
relevance of this account.  The ’shock’ of women’s introduction into Solheimsviken appears 




We deploy two socio-economic theories to inform our historical analysis.  We use IROHS, 
relevant to heavy industry because it highlights work’s physical consequences and locates 
them within organisational realities.  We nest the IROHS framework in the wider context of 
‘gendered organisation’ theory since the latter provides a broader yet complementary 
perspective on women’s shipyard experience.  
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        IROHS firmly situates occupational health and safety within workplace power relations.  
Its key tenets are enunciated in Nichols and Armstrong (1973).  They explain that it was 
initiated by a cohesive international group of industrial researchers, stimulated by numerous 
dramatic accidents which occurred across the world in the 1970s, affecting both industrial 
workers and the public.  The context was one of state awareness that previous piecemeal 
approaches to workplace health and safety required revision.  At that point, the linked 
subjects of industrial relations and industrial sociology were both much researched and 
discussed in universities, and the IROHS pioneers connected these streams of discussion with 
that concerned with industrial accidents and ill-health.  Consistent with the political Zeitgeist, 
they presented a coherent and internally consistent pro-worker alternative to the academic 
orthodoxy of the time, later summarised by Theo Nichols (1994: 387) as ‘blaming the 
victim.’  They sought to explain the long-term persistence of industrially-generated injury 
and ill-health, why it was especially prevalent in certain countries, industries and workplaces, 
and advanced ways of addressing these problems (Nichols, 1994).   
        IROHS theory differentiates itself from mainstream OHS research. The latter operates in 
a quasi-medical paradigm, and has a unitary vision of manager-worker relations in which 
OHS is abstracted from tensions between different workplace actors’ interests (Walters et al, 
2016).  It has nonetheless long provided strong empirical evidence of serious health 
consequences including high incidences of spontaneous abortion among women working in 
Nordic shipyards in the 1970s (Hemminki et al, 1983), which provides grounds for supposing 
that IROHS is relevant to women’s experience in Solheimsviken.  Overall, IROHS theory 
suggests that working environments, management attitudes, practices and rhetoric based on 
OHS, women’s self-activity and voice are inter-related and condition women’s experience.  
IROHS emphasises how managers interpret and use task allocation and OHS to exercise 
control over labour within structural drives towards cost reduction (Walters et al, 2016).  It 
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stresses managements’ ultimate responsibility for working environments and the importance 
of long-term health issues.  This contrasts with managers’ common stress on workers’ 
individual responsibilities for the safety of themselves and others as part of an emphasis on 
accident prevention.  Managers construct OHS as primarily a matter of individual worker 
characteristics and behaviours, and appropriate it as a disciplining tool on individual workers 
(Nichols & Armstrong, 1973; James and Walters, 2002).  IROHS therefore also underlines 
the centrality of collective worker voice to challenging managerial policies; the extent to 
which this challenge exists helps explain variations in worker health and safety. In the ideal 
model, voice initiates bargaining, leading to negotiated outcomes rather than unilaterally-
determined management ones.  Unions may also through political action influence state 
regulatory structures such as legislation and inspection to the same end.  The relative strength 
of these arrangements help explain international differences in problem solution (James and 
Walters, 2002).   Collective voice on OHS should therefore be backed by strong 
governmental regulation.  Where regulation is weak, workers may exit where they see OHS 
risk as unacceptably high but this tends to leave the status quo unchallenged (Nichols and 
Armstrong, 1973; James and Walters, 2002).   
        Voice is viewed less in the individualised or ‘business-case’ senses advanced by 
‘Organisational Behaviour’ (although that may be useful in certain exceptionally supportive 
organisational contexts)  but  more in that of collective, independent worker representation as 
theorised by industrial relations scholars (Quinlan, 1996, pp. 412-413).  This opens the 
possibility of transcending ‘access to authority’ models of voice used in ‘Organisational 
Behaviour’ theories; weak access to authority is widely held to hinder progress towards equal 
pay for example (Bishu & Alkadry, 2017).  Crucially, IROHS’  IR element does not equate 
collective voice with unions. Worker collectives may manifest collective voice and effective 
collective organisation may operate independently of unions; Quinlan (2017) showed the 
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importance and extent of pre-union organisation and mobilisation around OHS matters. 
Nevertheless, a stream of publications shows how unions can provide institutional support 
and protection for workers exercising individual voice and sizeable positive union effects on  
worker health have regularly been demonstrated (Zoorob, 2018).  IROHS has been concerned 
with groups traditionally marginal to union organisation. Quinlan shows how women’s 
physical experience of work and its relationship to voice and exit has been occluded by 
inappropriate assumptions such as that women work in ‘relatively safe’ jobs (Quinlan, 1996, 
pp. 410-414).  However, although Quinlan devoted specific attention to their experience,  and 
Lippel and Messing (2014) have recently summarised women’s overall position in general 
terms, IROHS theory more widely has only inconsistently placed them at the centre of 
discussion and analysis.   
 
          We therefore use gendered organisation theory as an outer frame for IROHS within our 
conceptual framework, since women’s experiences of organisations are central to it.  
Gendered organisation theory aims to explain why organisations have long-standing 
structures and cultures disadvantaging women in numerous ways which ensure that attempts 
to change them commonly fail or, at best, have only marginal ameliorative effects.  The 
founding work in this school of thought is Acker’s (1990) influential and widely-used 
theorisation of the ‘gendered organisation’ which shows how organisations are never gender-
neutral.  Rather, deeply-embedded gendered constructs structure every aspect of 
organisational relations, including divisions of labour and physical space which might be 
perceived as ‘gender neutral’.  Organisational hierarchies propagate visions of the ‘assumed 
worker’ as male. The skills and competences most highly valued are those associated with 
masculinity and are paid accordingly (Bailyn, 2006).  Images and rhetoric are created by male 
organisational hierarchies, becoming powerful tools in embedding gendered assumptions, 
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thereby reproducing women’s workplace subordination.  Solheimsviken and shipbuilding 
more widely fits into this analytic frame: managers at all levels were exclusively male.  
These theories inform our approach to our research question:  How far may the experience of 
introducing women into Solheimsviken be seen as a ‘success’?  
 
      
Method 
We used company documents and union material in the Bergen Public Archive (BPA) 
including 105 uncatalogued boxes of documents generated by management and 37 from the 
union office (categories K762-798).  Some were not allocated numbers.  Significant lacunae 
were created in the management records by two rounds of disposals conducted in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Newspaper sources were therefore searched comprehensively via their paper files 
for 1965-1980.  We used the company’s internal newspapers Linken and Båt og Bedding, also 
lodged in the BPA (Box 778).  We trawled the main local newspaper, the mass circulation 
daily Bergens Tidende, because it had strong sources within the company.  It supported the 
social democratic party Venstre (‘Left’).  Bergens Tidende provided considerable detail on 
company public announcements and accounts. We also used the conservative national daily 
Aftenposten since it was concerned with national policies on shipbuilding, furnishing national 
level reactions to the introduction of women into workplaces.  These sources collectively 
document our analysis’ main pillars, while later testimony mainly plays a supplementary or 
secondary role.  We used oral accounts to stimulate discussion with interview respondents 
and to pursue detail where the documents were silent or had been destroyed.  We 
occasionally use interviews to make key points.  We do so only when the evidence appeared 
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in more than one transcript, and when it appeared reliable and consistent with documentary 
evidence.  We sought interviewees through an advertisement in Bergens Tidende which we 
then followed up by ‘snowballing’ from those who responded.  We conducted 18 interviews 
involving 30 ex-workers and managers from among those who worked in the heyday of 
women’s employment in the 1960s and 1970s.  Most were paired interviews, conducted 
between late 2017 and early 2018.  Our sample was selected to contain a balance between 
senior and junior managers, and women and men workers.  Interviews lasted between one 
and two hours and were transcribed, coded thematically and translated into English.  We 
asked a set of questions about how the women recruits experienced and were received and 
regarded across the period.  In addition, we invited respondents to range freely across 
anything they felt relevant to our research question. All respondents except one gave 
permission to use their real names but we use pseudonyms throughout.   
    We anticipated that our case’s high public profile in Norway might affect memory as other 
works have documented (see for example strong evidence of ‘rose-tinting’ effects in 
Harrisson, 1976).  The experience of a previously prominent shipyard could be expected to 
generate contested, possibly idealised memories coloured by intervening public debates.  We 
also expected differences between actors’ ‘public transcripts’, that is statements for public 
consumption, often ‘designed to conceal or euphemize dirty linen’ (Scott, 1990, p. 18) and 
‘hidden transcripts’.  The latter depict private views which might be perceived as negative, an 
implication which the individual involved wishes for some reason to avoid. We therefore 
distinguish between different types of account both across and within documentary and 






Solheimsviken and its marine engineering works were founded in 1855 (Myran & Fasting 
1955, p. 28), and comprised part of the sizeable South Norwegian shipbuilding industry 
(Andersen 1989, pp. 70-71). The yard’s productive facilities were considerably expanded in 
the 1950s (Andersen, 1989, pp. 216-217). At its immediate post-1945 peak BMV, the 
company which then owned Solheimsviken and its sister yard Laksevaag, employed almost 
three thousand workers, and was Norway’s biggest private employer.     
    By 1965 the yard covered 40 thousand square metres. Aker Group, a large Norwegian 
firm, owned the yard from 1965 to 1983.  Solheimsviken was deeply embedded in the local 
community; the overwhelming majority of employees lived in Bergen (Linken, 1984, May). 
Housing was built by the company for workers in the Nineteenth Century, comprising houses 
situated some 300 metres from the yard gates.  The juxtaposition of the architecturally 
massive and industrially distinctive shipyard with the small dwellings emphasised the scale of 
the transition from domestic to working life when workers entered the yard.   Ship launches 
were celebratory events involving large sections of the local population, and reflected pride in 
their products and ships’ utility to a seafaring nation. Solheimsviken’s importance to Bergen 
was underlined when local government bought equity in the cooperative created to rescue it 
in 1985 (Økland & Croucher, 2017). 
   After 1945, Norwegian shipbuilding productivity was recognised as significantly lower 
than that in other Nordic countries (Andersen 1989, p. 211). Two national committees were 
charged by the government with improving their competitiveness (Andersen 1989, pp. 211-
212). Their chair, Professor Vedeler, argued along Fordist lines for centrally-planned 
standardized ships, built in sections and assembled using electric welding. His ideas were 
implemented at the largest Norwegian shipyards, including Solheimsviken, in the 1940s and 
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1950s (Andersen 1989, pp. 216-217). Building ships in sections, Vedeler’s key proposal, was 
modeled on Swedish practice and proved successful (Andersen 1989, p. 223). Until at least 
the mid-1960s, large Norwegian shipyards nevertheless also predominantly followed their 
earlier ‘British’ strategy of ‘craft-oriented teamwork based on separate trades and a low 
degree of planning’ (Andersen, 1997, p. 486).  In this system,  planning and production were 
devolved to foremen and senior journeymen, fostering skilled workers’ job control, now 
increasingly threatened by centralised production planning.   
     Managers were sympathetic to these workforce concerns; Solheimsviken almost 
exclusively promoted its own craftsmen to managerial positions (Sørli, 1976).  However, by 
1980, international competition began seriously to threaten the industry’s continued 
existence.  In serious difficulties from that point, Solheimsviken became a workers’ 
cooperative in 1985 and remained one until its closure in 1990 (Gilje, 2010).  The industry 
persists in diminished form: Bergen yards currently continue to produce oil industry vessels 
and rigs (OECD, 2017, pp. 1-20). 
Women workers’ recruitment. 
      Hiring additional workers was discussed internally as Solheimsviken’s need for skilled 
workers became urgent in 1965, and management anticipated further strengthening of 
demand. Management introduced women slowly, after ‘strictly evaluating’ applicants 
(Bergens Tidende, 1966, November 24).  In 1965, the first three women were recruited to  
jobs as skilled production workers. Managers were nervous, because they were uncertain how 
this would play out in practice, and were initially reluctant to inform the press (Bergens 
Tidende, 1966, September 8).  They admitted that the workers’ negotiating committee had 
initially ‘strongly discouraged’ women’s recruitment.  Precisely why they did so is unclear 
from the sources available, but the union soon conceded that failing such recruitment the yard 
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would be unable to meet their contractual obligations to shipping companies and dropped 
their opposition (Bergens Tidende, 1966, September 8).   
Top management and the union discussed staffing in their well-established joint cooperation 
committee (Sørli, 1976, p. 104). The committee debated the relative desirability of recruiting 
handicapped individuals, British workers or Norwegian women (Sørli, 1976, pp. 104-106). 
Revealingly, worker representatives excluded the first two possibilities (Sørli, 1976, p.104). 
A further recruitment round conducted in 1970 was extensively debated in the cooperation 
committee, surfacing insiders’ reactions. The minutes for 5 February1970, item no. 2, 
recorded: “We can….count on the female workforce as a large reserve”.  The ‘reserve’ 
formulation was later used by management in connection with women’s role inside 
Solheimsviken where they were often referred to as ‘helpers’; the ‘reserve’ was to prove 
smaller in reality than hoped.  Committee members’ reservations emerged: “There can be 
differing opinions about whether our environment is suitable for women”, the chair remarked 
(Sørli 1976, p. 105). Male workers’ attitudes surfaced more clearly on 3 November 1970.  
After consultation with departmental sub-committees, management sought to allay male 
workers’ concerns: “It is not the intention that the female workforce will block possibilities 
for our current male workforce...”.  Women would be recruited ‘as equals within our old 
“boy’s club…the company environment will surely adjust as we go.’ (Cooperation 
committee, 1970, November 3. Box 771, BPA).  The union and management agreed that 
women should be recruited and treated initially as trainees and not apprentices to avoid delay 
in deploying them.  Significantly, the joint decision meant that the traditional comprehensive 
socialisation undergone by all skilled men which instilled cultures, norms, expectations and 
enforcement mechanisms associated with the welding occupation and craft were by-passed.  
Against this background, it is hardly surprising if women later failed to achieve equality of 
status in practice.   
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On 15 July 1965 the new recruits were publicly announced and celebrated as a national ‘first’ 
through a press release used by the leading national newspaper (Aftenposten, 1965).  From 
1965 to 1989 Solheimsviken recruited 100 women most of whom lived locally (Figures 
compiled from BMV Solheimsviken AS. Records of recruited and terminated workers: 1965-
1989. Bergen Public Archive.  Unnumbered separate files). 79 were between 16 and 25 years 
old; the rest were in their 30s and 40s. The overwhelming majority were employed as trainee 
welders, and were allocated positions on the lower points of a graded occupational scale for 
welders after a few weeks training. Some recruits suggested that they started at the yard ‘by 
chance’ or as an ‘adventure’ (Bergens Tidende, 1970, August 22) but both this newspaper 
report and our interview respondents articulated varied individual motives. Community and 
family encouragement--qualified by concern about the working environment--was a major 
theme; many reported having friends or relatives already working in the yard who  functioned 
as initial guides and mentors.  The recruits’ strong ties to the tight local community meant 
that their experience resonated when further recruitment was attempted.  Many respondents 
recalled that they were told that they might not stay long: their adventure might be brief.  A 
second theme was the enticing prospect of high and equal pay as specified in the company’s 
advertisements, when equal pay within the different welder grades was referred to (Bergens 
Tidende, 1970, December 12).  The head personnel officer reported that most recruits took 
‘feminist’ positions with respect to their rights to work in ‘male’ jobs (Bergens Tidende, 
1972, July 14). Our interviews showed that some held feminist ideas in a more developed and 
comprehensive sense.  
    In late 1966, management informed the press that recruitment of women had been 
satisfactory.  The head of personnel suggested that women were ‘slipping smoothly’ into the 
‘male environment’ (Ibid. p.20).  He explained that their absorption was important for 
changing the yard’s workplace culture; it was not simply a matter of meeting demand for 
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labour (ibid.). Yet, for reasons we explore below, recruitment remained inadequate to 
management’s needs.  The yard’s local reputation as a ‘tough’ environment was confirmed by 
the women recruits, deterring more women from applying. The Personnel Manager later 
repeated that Solheimsviken would have liked to have recruited more women and to have 
introduced them into skilled jobs other than welding (Bergens Tidende, (1970, December 12; 
1970, December 19). Later interviews confirmed that a shortage of applicants persisted 
throughout the 1970s.  By 1980, Bergen yards reported ‘major dropout’ of women workers 
on their own initiative as product demand reduced (Bergens Tidende, 1980, April 12).   
Women welders’ work, health, task allocation and pay. 
Women recruits underwent some weeks of initial training followed by on the job 
development. They worked in different ways; the great majority worked in enclosed booths in 
the welding hall, as a group of women, but some also worked ‘2 and 2’ with a skilled man, as 
half of a team of four on other welding jobs.  Skilled men combined supervisory and 
workmate roles in relation to them.  Welding was conceived of as work at different skill 
levels, and pay reflected that through the grading system which constituted the basis for piece 
work payments.  From 1967, welders’ pay rates were formally equal between women and 
men.  Welders were paid at one of seven different levels according to their seniority and the 
perceived degree of skill required.  Thus, pay was related to their workplace seniority, 
training and journeymen/managers’ perceptions of their skill (which could be influenced by 
negotiation).  Contemporary management documentation showed that women’s earnings 
clustered in the lower half of welders’ pay distribution ( Untitled, uncatalogued document 
1975, December 8).    Consistent and complete time series earnings data are unavailable, but 
from the fragmentary sources we estimate the median intra-occupational gender pay gap to 
have been approximately 24% in 1970; one ex-manager argued that this gap may have 
narrowed by 1980.  
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      Cultural expectations of job tenure – seniority was strongly linked to status -- were set by 
male journeymen who expected to work at Solheimsviken for around 50 years (Müller, 2000: 
43).  Moreover, two years’ experience was required to attempt the daunting national Veritas 
certification test to improve their credentials as welders and move up the grades.  Yet almost 
no recruits stayed long enough to qualify to acquire certification.  35 women left 
Solheimsviken within one year, in 21 cases since they felt they were in the ‘wrong working 
environment’, while just over half of the 21 who offered further detail specified illness as 
their reason for leaving (internal documentation, 1965-1989.  Book in BPA). Women’s stated 
reasons for leaving must be approached cautiously partly because women’s positive accounts 
of their experience contrast sharply with company data on their short job tenures.  Women 
giving the ‘illness’ response may have thought it constituted an ‘acceptable’ reason. Yet 
women sometimes gave ‘acceptable’ answers that masked illness.  Anne (see below) was 
induced by potentially serious work-related health problems to accept a job outside 
Solheimsviken. She experienced neck strain caused by wearing welders’ heavy protective 
equipment, which medical advisers informed her could mean her having to leave her job.  
Asked why she was leaving, she replied ‘got another job’ (internal documentation, 1965-
1989. Book in BPA). The illness reason is also a plausible cause for women’s short job 
tenure, as the testimony given by women in the interviews we conducted in 2017/18 
demonstrated. Heavy protective equipment, dirt, potential for burns from sparks (‘my arms, 
hands and body parts were once totally in flames’, Birgit recalled), fumes and electric shocks 
when welding rods were exposed to rain were among the issues highlighted by interviewees.  
Welding certain metals such as zinc had been recognised by management as a problem since 




   Health problems among welders were first reported to occupational health journals in the 
1930s. An extensive occupational health literature developed post-1945, reporting on 
research in Nordic shipyards. It documented high rates of chronic health issues among 
welders. ‘Welder’s whistle’ (caused by particles lodged in lungs) could develop into 
‘welders’ lung’, a fibrositis-type of condition.  Its higher incidence when welding in confined 
spaces as the women in Solheimsviken did became well-established (Bonde 1993; Hemminki 
et al, 1983, p. 369). Its main symptom was coughing which could develop into more serious 
lung problems within a year of initial exposure (Bonde, 1993).  Other shipyard work such as 
painting, handling and cutting asbestos was also hazardous, but welding stood out by its wide 
incidence and rapid impact (Bonde, 1993).  The yard’s management and union recognised 
many hazards in the 1970s (Bergens Tidende, 1975, March 22). Anne, the shop steward 
mentioned above, who was generally positive about BMV management, rejected any 
suggestion that managers took the issue seriously, adding bluntly: ‘when we welded the 
fumes went into our lungs’.  In short, women recruits were allocated jobs recognised as 
carrying significant health hazards, but management and union alike were not regarded by 
Anne--nor by other respondents-- as proactive in solving them.   
   Women’s ‘public’ accounts, both contemporaneous and decades later, often stressed that  
male workers and foremen generally received them in positive, respectful and ‘protective’ 
ways.  The ‘protective’ approach was double-edged: it limited women’s opportunities while 
simultaneously helping ensure that they were not exposed to excessive risk.  Conceptions of 
appropriate work for women and of ‘protecting’ them were central to management’s actions 
in restricting women to relatively unskilled tasks within the broad welder category.  Women 
were portrayed by managers as requiring ‘easy’ jobs.  Helmut, a foreman, commented when 
interviewed in 2017: ‘One reason why they were welders and why they worked inside the 
hall is that those were the easiest jobs, the lightest jobs…..They started with plates that lay 
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flat on the floor.  They could sit nicely on a box and weld.’ Helmut’s argument reflected a 
gendered view of women’s physical capacities. Other more senior managers shared that view. 
Outside, it was often intensely cold working on ships’ skins, and Solheimsviken workers 
lacked the warm padded overalls provided in some other local yards.  The work was crucial 
to ships’ integrity, only highly skilled welders were allocated it and it carried higher-graded 
pay. A handful of women asked successfully to carry the work out, but a senior production 
manager (chair of the management-union cooperation committee) later argued that ‘They 
soon discovered it was not that smart, it was darn cold……there is a difference between men 
and women after all.…….’ (Fred, head of production). Fred clearly conceptualised the 
situation more in gender terms than as a lack of custom-made warm clothing available to all.  
Thus, male managerial attitudes  ensured that women welders remained in the lower-paid 
types of welding work.   
The management success narrative, OHS and externally-driven change. 
Management generally advanced a public narrative of success and satisfaction in the 
women’s recruitment, an argument that supported their recruitment efforts. Notes prepared by 
an unknown but clearly senior personnel manager at Solheimsviken for a speech (apparently 
to industry colleagues and therefore possibly influenced by a feeling that Solheimsviken 
should be portrayed positively) in December 1975 presented an upbeat account, while 
acknowledging serious issues (‘Lecture - women in heavy industry’ 1975. Bergen Public 
Archive (BPA) Box 74).  The speaker painted an overall picture of unalloyed success in 
deploying women as ‘supplementary’ labour.  He concluded his speech with a significant 
rhetorical flourish: ‘Quit working at the yard? No way!’  In common with other contemporary 
managerial accounts, he stressed women’s ‘equal’ treatment and the smoothness of their 
integration.  However, he simultaneously argued that many current arrangements and 
attitudes needed to change, and admitted that recruitment had to improve.  This senior 
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manager recognised publicly that very few women ‘graduated’ to better-paid welding work.  
He also—revealingly--spent much time discussing OHS matters and stressing their 
importance. He focused exclusively on employee recruitment and worker responsibilities.  
His message was that OHS issues in the ‘tough’ conditions had to be managed by only 
recruiting healthy workers and that protective equipment had to be worn by them at all times. 
Yet he mentioned no measure taken by management to reduce internal environmental 
problems at source via for example effective (if potentially costly) local exhaust ventilation 
rather than by personal protection of questionable effectiveness. He conveyed no sense of 
management’s primary responsibility for OHS.  His speech thus conformed to IROHS theory.  
His account is consistent with that given by Fred that in the 1970s the yard was an 
inhospitable working environment. Fred suggested that by 1980—by which point very few 
women remained-- the yard environment had greatly improved, because of the Norwegian 
government’s Work Act.  Inter alia, improved lighting and better personal protective 
equipment including fresh air masks for welding were introduced as a result of that 
legislation.  As the BMV Annual  Report (BMV, 1977), hitherto almost entirely unconcerned 
with workers’ health and safety, reported, the company’s occupational health service was also 
expanded and ‘modernised’.      
In the next section we explain why few challenges arose to problematic managerial attitudes 
and practices.   
Women and voice 
The union and voice 
         Institutionalised collective voice through the union had deep roots in Solheimsviken.    
Management and unions cooperated increasingly extensively post-1945, stimulated initially 
by a sense of national reconstruction (Myran & Fasting, 1955, p. 241) and then by 
21 
 
intensifying Asian competition.  The cooperation was publicly articulated in a joint interview 
with Solheimsviken’s CEO Arne Osland and union club leader Kåre Fiskeseth in a national 
film broadcast in 1971 (NRK, 1971). Osland and Fiskeseth outlined and defended a jointly 
agreed  strategic approach that included but also transcended specific personnel and labour 
questions to encompass the yard’s wider strategy.  In principle, no area was out of bounds; 
the union was at least at the rhetorical/ideological levels a full co-management partner.  By 
1962, Iron and Steel had been functioning in the yard for some sixty years, and was well-
ensconced, with a full-time convenor of shop stewards with his own office, paid for by the 
company. From 1970, three full-time positions for union leaders were allowed for on the 
payroll. Management (unlike in some rival yards) was regularly invited to address mass 
meetings on major issues.  In 1962, the union club had recorded in its annual report ‘We 
thank management for always being positive and for their willingness to collaborate.’(BMV 
union club, 1962, p. 27).  This relationship grew in importance across subsequent years as 
international competition intensified (Sørli, 1976). 
         Until 1965, skilled work was men’s exclusive preserve. For the previous two decades, 
women worked in the canteen and cleaning.  Women cleaners in Solheimsviken and its sister 
yard Laksevaag reported in the early 1980s that they were ‘respected’ by the men, although 
the women felt that some male workers ‘would never let their wife take such a job’.  The 
women referred to strong associative links between them as sustaining their morale, but felt 
that they were not treated as an integral part of the workplace community.  They agreed that 
they would like to be considered ‘part of the total function and treated accordingly…’ 
(Linken, 1983, June).   Women’s subordinate position had deep historic roots.  The yard’s 
union, through its Women’s Association (WA) had since 1931 institutionalised women’s 
participation in union affairs in subordinate, domestic-related roles. Its meetings were revived 
post-war and the WA worked to build the union’s vacation house and to cook and serve 
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meals at the union’s annual excursions to it (Nygårdsvik, Wiik, & Larsen (1945).  The WA’s 
committee complained of low participation, asking whether it was due to male union 
members stopping women going out in the evenings (Nygårdsvik et al. 1945).  The women 
welders recruited from 1965 onwards and interviewed in 2017-18 defined their expectations 
against the cleaners’ and WA committee’s experiences. Thus, the mid-1960s marked an 
apparently radical departure in women’s workplace participation which implicitly challenged 
previous gendered assumptions and symbolized wider generational changes that potentially 
threatened craftsmen’s position as labour aristocrats. 
                    
        The union ‘club’s’ (see below) democratic culture was institutionally rooted in the 
booths in which the journeymen gathered in their different trades before work and during 
breaks.  The booths were sites for time-served journeymen, which the women were not.  They 
were archetypical male spaces which constituted the foundations of union democracy, 
conducting wide-ranging informal discussion of workplace matters between peers (Økland & 
Croucher, 2017).   Iron and Steel was the main union, with overwhelming membership (a 
small number of electricians were members of their own union).  Inside the yard, the unions 
liaised through a joint ‘club’.  Iron and Steel had permitted women’s membership for decades 
(Olstad & Halvorsen, 1990). The union ethos was that skilled work was journeymen’s 
preserve, and this was central to the workplace culture and the way it subordinated women.  
Skilled men exhibited intense pride in their workplace identity and status through their body 
language, demeanour, verbal expression, clothing and attitudes (Alveng & Müller, 1990). 
That this was accepted by others was underlined and ritualistically demonstrated when 
foremen brought experienced craftsmen to show advanced techniques such as vertical 
welding to women and apprentices.  In a classic illustration of the gendered organisation in 
action, one young woman responded by showing her own skills, earning the remark from a 
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young male onlooker“What a little asshole she was!  Couldn’t she just have watched, and 
seen how fantastic it was when he welded!” (Alveng and Müller, 1990, pp. 42-43).  
       Union democracy was strong, precisely because it was restricted: it was founded on an 
exclusive philosophy that democratic rights went hand in hand with skill. Office-holding had 
in practice been reserved exclusively for journeymen; status and influence within the union 
continued to reflect skill.  Women’s low status both in the key foundational institutions of the 
workplace community--the booths—and the union were intimately linked with their not 
having served apprenticeships.  Birgit  recounted how the skilled union leader she worked 
with (‘kind of a rough type of guy’) made it clear that he did not want to work with her at all 
because she was not a union member, had not served an apprenticeship and because he would 
have to do more heavy lifting.  She described the lifting argument as ‘bullshit’ because cranes 
were used to move heavy plates and ‘not one single man had to do any more lifting’. Else 
reported what she regarded as failures in union democracy.  She said that her male steward 
refused to conduct a vote on an overtime issue, because her shift’s votes were too few to 
outweigh those of the other shift. She complained, as she regarded that refusal as both a 
failure to grasp their need to express their views and as showing a broader and characteristic 
insensitivity to minority rights.  Such practices, she perceived, carried negative implications 
for women’s union voice.   
      Union representation was seen by women interviewees as important to earnings.  
Stewards could negotiate appropriate rates, task allocation and training.  Anne-Brit, a 
member of Iron and Steel, recalled ‘You did not achieve top wages if you were not 
unionized.’ The union was also well-placed to affect OHS issues, since (unlike in some 
workplaces) its shop stewards were also responsible for health and safety matters, raising 
issues through the well-established union-management cooperation committee. But the 
women recruits’ levels of union membership and participation were both lower than among 
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men. The union did not function as a vehicle for collective voice for the women as a specific 
group (Braathen, 1987). No woman sat on the club’s committee in 1965-80. Anne therefore 
berated the union club for only representing a part of its membership.  She viewed the 
possibilities for women to improve conditions through this important formal channel as 
minimal. 
Women recruits and the workplace community 
         Formal channels were not the only ones available to women. Informal associative links 
with the male workforce, and contact with management could also potentially offer 
possibilities for women to address issues.  Yet, as gendered organisational theory proposes, 
the yard’s social climate militated against maximising these possibilities.  Male imagery was 
prominent in the workshops and underlined women’s secondary (‘reserve’) role within them. 
In one, a picture of nude women from ‘Playboy’ was posted on a workshop wall, which some 
women vociferously objected to.  A senior production manager, Fred, commented (in what 
may be a ‘public’ account): ‘We managed to remove it, it never became a big issue. We did 
not want it there.  We had to make sure it was removed.  But …..some of those old-timers 
had pictures on the inside of their lockers.  So when they opened the door you could see a 
half-naked person there.….. the ladies were angry about it.’  Such pictures were tolerated 
inside men’s lockers, but not outside them.  This manager felt he had trodden a careful line 
between men and women’s differing wishes.  The women could not however relax in their 
‘own’ spaces in the yard, which were very limited.  Elinor gave a ‘private’ perspective: 
Elinor: God, how primitive, we had our own toilets, because that was employment law, but  
peeking holes used to appear between the toilets between the toilets, so if you did not check 
when you came into the toilet, to make sure the stuffing in the hole had not been removed, 
you could risk someone watching you. 
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Interviewer: So then your male workmates could watch you.  But that hole, who made it? 
Else: We can’t say, it was not the ladies at least (laughs). 
In these lights, it is unsurprising that the women recruits reported a semi-detached 
relationship to the male workplace community. They suggested that they often sat with the 
men at breaks, though they reported almost no contact with senior managers. The women also 
developed their own community by sitting together in their half hour lunch breaks in the 
cafeteria.  Women’s relationship to the male workplace community was thus ambivalent, 
minimizing the scope for informal voice and collective action.   
‘Fitting in’ 
The women recruits’ norms gave little support to notions of collectively voicing women’s 
concerns. Women gave public accounts of their experience which were both consistent with 
and supportive of the management ‘success’ narrative.  One early interview given to the 
shipyard newspaper Båt og Bedding may stand for many others from the mid-1960s in the 
way that the issues women faced surfaced even when the central message and tone was 
positive.  The reporter wrote about Nina Halvorsen, a welder, ‘popular……young and always 
smiling’.  She wished to thank the male workers and management for her reception in the 
yard.  She rejected the suggestion that she was ‘thought of as just a woman’ and it helped in 
this respect that she dressed like other welders and did not ‘flit about in a skirt’. Despite early 
problems, improvements had been made in welfare provision such as the introduction of 
women’s showers. (Båt og Bedding, 1965, July-December Box 781, BPA).  Women’s public 
accounts to the local newspaper recognised positive aspects of working in the yard: they 
reported enjoying working while free from ‘local, bossy managers’ most commonly in retail 
environments, and not having to smile at work all day (Bergens Tidende, 1980, April 14).  
Public expression of satisfaction was part of their broader stress on ‘fitting in.’ In one of a 
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number of similar testimonies, Elinor recalled women’s efforts to be ‘one of the gang’ in the 
yard.  She then added:  ‘I don’t think I would have fitted in there in the long run….  But I also 
want to add that it is quite possible that the foremen and others had a different perception of 
us coming there than we did ourselves.’   
   In short, while in their ‘public transcripts’ most women expressed an accommodative stance 
towards what they perceived as normal shipyard practice, their accounts indicated the issues 
that led to short job tenure.  In more clearly private accounts, they alluded to the gap between 
their perceptions and those of ‘foremen and others’.  Hence, women were accommodating  
the predominant workplace culture rather than simply accepting it.  Helmut, a foreman, 
himself argued that efforts to ‘fit in’ on the women’s part were necessary.  Asked if any 
women did not ‘fit in’, he responded:  
‘Those women that he (John, his co-interviewee: authors) mentioned, who tried to dominate 
in a manly domain, who kind of set themselves on the outside.   
Interviewer: So, like the feminist that you mentioned? 
Helmut: Yes, and she did not stay very long.’ 
The ‘fitting in’ norm also manifested itself in their woman union steward’s willingness or 
otherwise to raise matters central to women’s interests. Faced with women asking for issues 
of task allocation to be taken up with management, Anne saw this as an inappropriate 
demand.  Thus, women, who occupied a strategically important position at the start of the 
production process which might have been exploited to bring the yard to a halt did not 
mobilize collectively on the issue.  In short, little pressure was exerted by women on 






We set out to investigate how far may the experience of introducing women into 
Solheimsviken be seen as a ‘success’?  Women’s introduction partially met an immediate 
need for labour but was far from an unmitigated success for several reasons.  
     The first set of reasons relates to concrete OHS issues, leading to women’s illness and 
short job tenure.  The women recruits’ rootedness in the local community meant that their 
experience limited the number of new recruits. Their experiences were linked to managerial 
policies and decisions which interpreted women’s reactions to working conditions within 
strongly gendered frames.  IROHS theory assisted understanding of how and why material 
work realities were interpreted by managers to justify their OHS actions, omissions and the 
decisions they took on task allocation.   Three management arguments and behaviours were 
central.  First, women were given ostensibly ‘easy’ work which in reality entailed serious 
health hazards.  Welders’ working environments changed primarily as a result of government 
legislation after most women had left.  Before then, few women stayed employed long 
enough to gain either sufficient experience or certification to undertake better-paid tasks.  
Second, the problems of ‘outside’ work were not addressed by protective measures used 
elsewhere but were passed over by reference to women’s supposed specific difficulty in 
dealing with cold.  Third, the ‘public’ management discourse of ‘success’ limited the scope 
for alternative views and legitimated gendered management decisions.  Limitations on 
women’s collective voice meant that these attitudes and behaviours encountered little 
challenge.  
     A second set of reasons was the tension between women’s gender egalitarian attitudes on 
the one hand and management’s creation and preservation of an intra-occupational pay gap 
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on the other.  Intra-occupational pay gaps are frequently related to in-job gender segregation 
(Bishu & Alkadry, 2017).  In this case it was also linked to women’s status in management 
and union’s eyes as a labour ‘reserve’ and as ‘helpers’ who should not ‘block’ male workers’ 
opportunities.  Women were and remained on the shipyard’s margins, consistent with long-
term conceptions of women’s roles in the yard.  Women employed in non-production jobs 
prior to 1965 had been regarded as adjunct members of the workplace community by 
management and male workers alike.  The women in the WA were encouraged to extend 
their domestic roles by serving male union members in similar ways.  From 1965, a new 
generation of women welders appeared who rejected these attitudes.  They were clearly not 
‘the assumed worker’ of gendered organisation theory. In our case, the yard’s culture was 
particularly strongly gendered. The generally tacit and submerged nature of male managers’ 
attitudes to women workers envisaged by gendered organisation theory were articulated in 
explicit formulations, and were even regarded as sufficiently acceptable as to be printed in 
the workplace newspaper.   Thus, the intra-occupational gender pay gap both reflected and 
epitomised a set of attitudes which many women recruits found unpalatable.  Further work 
connecting our case with criticisms of the notion that women occupy jobs in the secondary 
segment of a ‘dual’ labour market due to supply factors and low interest in their careers 
appears likely to yield further theoretic results.    
 
   IROHS theory provided distinctive assistance through its insistence on the significance of 
inclusion in and exclusion from collective voice and representation.  As we stressed above, 
voice in general is not coterminous with union voice, but in this context collective voice 
assumed great importance through the union’s close relationship with management. In 
Solheimsviken, women exercised voice, but only in individual and muted form, for several 
reasons. First, they had almost no everyday access to senior managers.  Second, the union 
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club-threatened by journeymen’s reduced role in production planning and engaged in close 
cooperation with management-took only a secondary interest in women’s issues. Third, in 
reaction, the woman shop steward during the period of maximum women’s employment 
refused participation in union committees, further reducing women’s influence on the ‘old 
boy’s club’.  Arguably, OHS improvements potentially beneficial to all workers and quite 
possibly to productive efficiency thereby became less likely.  It must be conceded that 
women’s voice on numerous issues, including OHS, was not solely determined by these 
circumscriptions, nor did their norm of ‘fitting in’ entirely prevent it.  Women explicitly 
identifying themselves as feminist were more likely to exercise voice than those holding 
feminist views in more dilute senses. Nevertheless, it remains the case that restricted voice 
was associated with high turnover, consistent with IROHS theory.  As we noted above, 
IROHS’ theory’s core asset has not been a consistent focus on women’s issues.  In this 
context, we contribute to it by showing the links between women’s experience of work, a 
lack of collective voice (including in a non-union sense) , exit and an intra-occupational pay 
gap.  As far as we are aware, these links have not previously been demonstrated as a totality.  
Future research might usefully pursue them.   
 
      Our case also allows historiographic comment.  Business history, seeking to explain 
European shipbuilding companies’ reactions to fierce Asian competition principally attends 
to several important issues: the terms of trade, international and national regulation, the 
extent to which it was possible to pursue national-level strategies, company level strategies, 
the (un)availability of adequate finance, and finally to how company strategy was rooted in 
existing socio-technical bases.  We contribute by providing significant detail in the social 
area.  Our case is in some senses consistent with Barnett’s (1996) conflict-dominated picture 
of British shipbuilding outlined above since workers’ different trades retained powerful 
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independent identities.    However, it also shows the limitations imposed by an industrial 
relations strategy which institutionalised management-union cooperation rather than conflict.  
The Solheimsviken management strategy was designed to integrate the skilled male work 
force into broad management perspectives but simultaneously limited the effectiveness of 
initiatives designed to increase employee functional flexibility such as women’s extended 
use, or craftsmen’s multi-skilling, which potentially involved disruption to the existing social 
fabric (Økland and Croucher, 2017).  These possibilities were referred to by the yard’s 
personnel manager when he expressed the hope that women’s successful introduction would 
change its culture.  This culture reflected and supported rigidly defined and enforced craft 
skills which effectively excluded the high levels of employee functional flexibility and 
related rapid rates of technological change manifested among Asian producers (Kong, 2006; 
OECD, 2017).   
   Historically, the experience was typical, contemporary sources suggested, of the many 
Norwegian shipyards which introduced women in the 1960s and 1970s and these in turn were 
similar to much West European shipyard practice at that time. Our case must be firmly 
located within its industrial and historical contexts, but we argue that it is nevertheless of 
considerable current interest.  Heavy industry, compared to some other environments, 
undoubtedly magnified the salience of OHS, but current working environments –which have 
migrated to the developing world rather than disappeared--nevertheless are also hardly 
hazard-free. Similarly, the international legacy of craft unionism which helped frame 
management mentalities and restricted women’s voice opportunities is almost certainly 
weaker currently than in the 1960s/70s.  Nevertheless, vestiges of its history remain present 
in some environments (Clarke, Winch, & Brockmann, 2013).    
   Overall, our research indicates that the dynamic inter-relationships between women’s 
physical and psycho-social work experiences, OHS, management rhetoric and tactics, 
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collective employee voice and turnover offer hitherto under-appreciated yet fruitful 
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